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Antitrust Sigiµficance of Covenants Not To Compete 
Covenants not to compete,1 despite their increasing prevalence 
and their obvious tendency to restrain competition, have seldom 
1. Among the more common covenants not to compete are: the covenant by the 
seller of a business and good will not to compete with the buyer, Davis v. Ebsco 
Industries, Inc., 150 So. 2d 460 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 196!1); a covenant by a shopping 
center lessor not to lease space in the center or on nearby property to anyone compet-
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been attacked under either federal or state antitrust laws.2 In January 
1965, however, William H. Orrick, Jr., then Assistant Attorney 
General in charge of the Antitrust Division, noted that the Division 
was becoming concerned about one aspect of the problem-the 
taking of overbroad covenants not to compete in connection with 
the purchase of a competitor.3 He suggested that such an agreement 
might have anticompetitive effects under either the Sherman Act4 
or section 7 of the Clayton Act.5 This note will explore the present 
status of covenants not to compete under both state and federal 
antitrust laws and will suggest a basis for the future development 
of the law. 
At common law, covenants not to compete have been upheld 
in a long line of decisions beginning with Mitchel v. Reynolds.0 
For such a covenant to be valid at common law, it must be ancillary 
to the main purpose of a valid contract, necessary to protect the 
covenantee in the enjoyment of the benefits of the contract, and 
not primarily intended to restrain competition.7 The prime concern 
of the common law was preventing harm to the covenantor and 
protecting th~ general public interest8 rather than preventing re• 
straints on competition-the prime concern of antitrust law. 
No instances have been found in which a covenant not to 
compete has been directly challenged by a state under its antitrust 
ing with one of his lessees, Utica Square, Inc. v. Renberg's, Inc., 390 P.2d 876 (Okla, 
1964); an employee's or partner's agreement not to compete with his employer or 
partners for a period after the termination of the employment or partnership, Lake• 
side Oil Co. v. Slutsky, 8 Wis. 2d 157, 98 N.W.2d 415 (1959); Brown v. Stough, 292 
P.2d 176 (Okla. 1956); an agreement by the licensee of know-how or trade secrets 
to observe territorial restraints upon the sale of the goods made pursuant to the 
know-how, United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours &: Co., 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 
1952), afj'd, 351 U.S. 377 (1956). 
2. See generally Blake, Employee Agreements Not To Compete, 73 HARV, L. REV. 
625 (1960); Bork, Ancillary Restraints and the Sherman Act, 15 A.B.A. ANTITRUST 
SECTION 211 (1959). 
3. Speech before the Antitrust Section of the N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Jan. 28, 1965, 
BNA A.T.R.R. No. 186, at A-14 (Feb. 2, 1965). Mr. Orrick's successor, Mr. Donald F. 
Turner, has not yet indicated a concern with this problem. 
4. Section 1 makes illegal every contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint 
of trade among the states. Section 2 prohibits monopolizing, or attempting to monop• 
olize, any part of the commerce among the states. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 
15 u.s.c. §§ 1-2 (1964). 
5. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), prohibits the acquisition 
of the stock or assets of one corporation by another "where in any line of commerce 
in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to 
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.'' 
6. I P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711). The court there held that a cove-
nant not to compete for five years, made ancillary to the lease of a bakery, was valid 
as a partial restraint of trade because it was reasonable from three viewpoints: the 
possibility of harm to the covenanter, the possibility of harm to the public, and the 
benefit enjoyed by the covenantee. 
7. United States v. Addyston Pipe &: Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271, 282 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 
175 U.S.-211 (1899). See generally 2 REsTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 514-16 (1933). 
8. See 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1636 (rev. ed. 1937). 
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statutes. A state prosecution is possible under statutes making cer-
tain covenants illegal, rather than merely void,9 but an apparent 
lack of official concern, coupled with difficulty in discovering viola-
tions, renders such an attempt unlikely. Nevertheless, a substantial 
body of law has developed through private contract actions in 
which the validity of such a covenant under the statute has been 
litigated; typically, the covenantee sues for specific performance or 
damages, and the covenantor raises the statute as a defense.10 The 
applicable state antitrust statutes fall into two general categories. 
One is the basic antitrust statute, prohibiting contracts, combina-
tions, and conspiracies in restraint of trade.11 In a number of states, 
this statute would be the only basis for an antitrust attack on a 
covenant not to compete. A few states, however, have, either in 
addition to or instead of the basic statute, a statute prohibiting 
contracts by which anyone is restrained from the exercise of any 
lawful business, trade, or profession.12 Such statutes normally con-
tain specific exceptions permitting the seller of good will of a 
1 business, corporate stock, or a partnership interest to agree to re-
frain from carrying on his former business for a reasonably limited 
time and within a reasonably limited area.13 
In applying antitrust statutes to covenants not to compete, most 
state courts continue to use the basic common-law tests of legality, 14 
9. In the majority of states, agreements in violation of the antitrust statutes are 
both illegal and void; the state therefore has a right to sue. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. 8e 
PROF. CODE §§ 16726, 16755; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 55-4-1 (1963); MINN; STAT. 
§ 623.01 (1961); Mo. REv. STAT. § 416.010 (1959). On the other hand, some statutes 
provide only that agreements in violation of the statute are void. This seems partiru-
larly true of specific statutes prohibiting restraints on the exercise of a business. See, 
e.g., ALA. CODE. tit. 9, § 22 (1958); M-oNT. R.Ev. CODES ANN. § 13-807 (1949); S.D. CODE 
§ 10.0705 (1939). 
10. See, e.g., Lakeside Oil Co. v. Slutsky, 8 Wis. 2d 157, 98 N.W.2d 415 (1959); 
Cottingham v. Engler, 178 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944). 
11. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 20-504 (1965); KAN. GEN. STAT. § 50-101 (1949); N.Y. GEN. 
Bus. LAw § 340; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1 (Replacement 1965). For a compilation of 
state antitrust statutes, see 4 TRADE REG. REP. 'if 'ii 30201-35501. 
12. ALA. CODE tit, 9, §§ 22-24 (1958); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-1401 (1956); 
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16600-02; FLA. STAT. § 542.12 (1963); MICH. COMP. LAws 
§§ 445.761, .766 (1948); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 13-807 to -809 (1947); N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 9-08-06 (1959); OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, §§ 217-19 (1961); S.D. CODE § 10.0706 (1939); 
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. arts. 7426, 7437 (1948). 
13. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 542.12 (1963); S.D. CODE § 10.0706 (1939). The Arizona statute, 
which does not expressly grant such exceptions, has been construed to provide them. 
See Bonney v. Northern Ariz. Amusement Co., 78 Ariz. 155, 277 P.2d 248 (1954), 
upholding a stockholder's covenant, ancillary to the sale to the company of his stock, 
not to compete with the company in a specified county for five years. 
14. Some courts have expressly held that state antitrust statutes were meant to 
apply common-law standards to covenants not to compete. E.g., Engles v. Morgenstern, 
85 Neb. 51, 122 N.W. 688 (1909). See also Morehead Sea Food Co. v. Way, 169 N.C. 
679, 86 S.E. 603 (1915); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-2 (Replacement 1965). More frequently, 
however, the courts simply apply common-law standards without comment. See John 
T. Stanley Co. v. Lagomarsino, 53 F.2d 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1931); Harbif v. Maslia, 214 Ga. 
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at least to the extent that they are not prevented from doing so 
by the language of a specific statute. Under both general and specific 
state statutes, a bare covenant not to compete, not ancillary to a 
valid main transaction, is usually void.15 Nevertheless, there have 
been some relatively recent cases in which non-ancillary covenants 
· have been upheld. The Kansas Supreme Court has upheld an agree-
ment among milk haulers by which route territories for hauling 
between producers and markets were divided.16 In an earlier deci-
sion, the Florida Supreme Court upheld a non-ancillary contract 
prohibiting a landowner from using his property for a cafeteria 
for 4½ years, emphasizing that the contract bound only the parties 
and restricted the use of only one piece of property.17 On the other 
hand, an ancillary covenant may still violate state antitrust laws. 
If the main purpose of the covenant is to restrain competition or 
create a monopoly, rather than to implement a valid principal 
transaction, the covenant is illegal.18 The state courts, like the 
federal courts applying federal law,19 have been willing to infer this 
illegal intent from the market position of the parties, the effect of 
the agreement upon actual or potential competition, the lack of 
a justification for the restriction in the legitimate needs of the 
covenantee, and other factors.20 
Ultimately, most litigation concerning covenants not to com-
pete raises the question of whether the covenant is, in fact, reason-
able. Since reasonableness must necessarily depend upon the facts 
of the individual case, there has been a broad range of decisions, 
particularly in states that do not have specific statutes covering 
covenants not to compete.21 These varying results are explicable 
654, 106 S.E.2d 905 (1959); Lakeside Oil Co. v. Slutsky, 8 Wis. 2d 157, 98 N.W.2d 415 
(1959). 
15. In re Holmes' Estate, 132 Kan. 443, 295 Pac. 716 (1931); Nichols v. Anderson, 
43 N.M. 296, 92 P .2d 781 (1939) {dictum). 
16. Okerberg v. Crable, 185 Kan. 211, 341 P.2d 966 (1959). The court applied a 
standard of reasonableness and found that no appreciable harm to the producers had 
resulted from the agreement. 
17. Janet Realty Co. v. Hoffman's, Inc., 154 Fla. 144, 17 So. 2d 114 (1944); cf. 
Robey v. Plain City Theatre Co., 126 Ohio St. 473, 186 N.E. 1 (1933), upholding a 
non-ancillary agreement whereby the owner of a theatre agreed not to use bis build-
ing for public gatherings. In neither case did the courts refer to existing state statutes 
invalidating combinations or contracts in restraint of trade. 
18. Hopkins v. Crantz, 334 Mich. 300, 54 N.W .2d 671 (1952). 
19. Sec notes 37-38 infra and accompanying text. 
20. Maola Ice Cream Co. v. Maola Milk&: Ice Cream Co., 238 N.C. 317, 77 S.E.2d 
910 (1953); Shute v. Shute, 176 N.C. 462, 97 S.E. 392 (1918); Herbert v. W. G. Dush &: 
Co., 298 S.W .2d 747 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956); Norfolk Motor Exchange v. Grubb, 152 
Va. 471, 147 S.E. 214 (1929). 
21. A number of decisions have upheld covenants unlimited as to time. Kutash v. 
Gluckman, 193 Ga. 805, 20 S.E.2d 128 (1942); Storer v. Brock, 351 Ill. 643, 184 N.E. 
868 (1933); Gallagher v. Vogel, 157 Neb. 670, 61 N.W.2d 245 (1953). Similarly, cove-
nants covering a number of states or the entire United States have been upheld. 
William T. Wiegand Glass Co. v. Wiegand, 105 N.J. Eq. 434, 148 Atl. 174 (1930) 
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primarily by the different views taken by the courts as to what is 
necessary in the particular instance for the protection of the cove-
nantee in his enjoyment of the main contract. Many of the statutes 
specifically prohibiting covenants not to compete, while exempting 
certain types of covenants, also provide express temporal and 
geographic limits for the exempted covenants, thus removing from 
the courts the function of determining the reasonableness of the 
covenant. Typical is California's statute,22 which restricts the opera-
tion of a covenant ancillary to the sale of good will or corporate 
shares to the area in which the business sold was carried on, and 
for only so long as the buyer, or a person deriving title from him, 
carries on a like business in that area.23 It has been held under 
such statutes that an otherwise valid covenant which exceeds the 
temporal or geographic limits of the statute is to be construed as 
having the maximum limits allowed by the statute and, as so 
construed, is valid.24 
Recent state decisions involving shopping centers have drawn 
attention to one particular kind of ancillary restraint: an agreement 
by a lessor not to use his land in competition with his lessee. The 
(entire United States); Diamond Watch Co. v. Roeber, 106 N.Y. 473, 13 N.E. 419 
(1887) (all states except Nevada and Montana); Ace Tackless Corp. v. American Tack-
less Corp., 1957 Trade Cas. 72575 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (entire United States); Eldridge v. 
Johnson, 195 Ore. 379, 245 P.2d 239 (1952) (Oregon and Washington for 10 years). 
On the other hand; numerous restraints which were shorter or more restricted geo-
graphically have been found to violate state antitrust statutes because the restraints 
were greater than necessary to achieve the legitimate object of the contract. Beit v. 
Beit, 135 Conn. 195, 63 A.2d 161 (1948) (one county); Thomas v. Costa! Industrial 
Services, Inc., 214 Ga. 382, 108 S.E.2d 328 (1959) (34 counties in Georgia and 12 
counties in South Carolina); Paramount Pad Co. v. Baumrind, 4 N.Y.2d 393, 175 
N.Y.S.2d 809, 151 N.E.2d 609 (1958) (3 years); Francis Rogers & Sons v. Eichert, 97 
N.Y.S.2d 659 (Sup. Ct. 1950) (5 years). For a collection of cases arising under both 
common law and statutes relating to the duration and the geographical extent of 
covenants not to compete, see, respectively, Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 77 (1956), and Annot., 
46 A.L.R.2d 119 (1956). 
22. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16601. 
23. There is evidenced in these statutes a less permissive attitude toward employee 
covenants not to compete after the termination of employment. Some states do not 
provide any exceptions for employee covenants, allowing them to fall within the 
absolute ban of the statute. See, e.g., E. S. Miller Lab. v. Griffin, 200 Okla. 398, 194 
P.2d 877 (1948); OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, §§ 217-19 (1961). On the other hand, the lack of 
a specific exception in the statute did not prevent the Oklahoma court from upholding 
a covenant in a shopping center lease which restricted the amount of space that 
could be rented to the lessee's competitors. Utica Square, Inc. v. Renbergs, Inc., 390 
P.2d 876 (Okla. 1964); cf. Boughton v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 231 Cal. App. 2d 188, 
41 Cal. Rptr. 714 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (restriction in a deed). Other statutes, although 
granting exceptions for employee covenants, provide more definite limits for them. 
MICH. COMP. LAws § 445.766 (1948) (limited to ninety days in the employee's own 
territory); S.D. CODE § 10.0706 (1939) (limited to ten years within a twenty-five mile 
radius of the employer's principal place of business). 
24. Yost v. Patrick, 245 Ala. 275, 17 So. 2d 240 (1944); Mahlstedt v. Fugit, 79 Cal. 
App. 2d 562, 180 P.2d 777 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947). For a general discussion of the severa-
bility of such contracts, see Note, 16 W. REs. L. REv. 161, 178-80 (1964). 
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current boom in shopping center construction has made such agree-
ments increasingly important from the standpoint of state antitrust 
policy. The increasing concern with the problem is reflected in two 
recent Texas decisions25 which have invalidated covenants in shop-
ping center leases because the covenants violated the state antitrust 
statute.26 In both cases, the courts appeared to be primarily inter-
ested in ensuring that the covenant would not be allowed to extend 
beyond its traditional scope and bind a third party whose property 
was not directly involved in the transaction between the lessor 
and lessee. 
In contrast to the relatively large body of state law relating to 
the status of covenants not to compete, there is little authority 
directly indicative of the position of such covenants under either 
the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act. The leading case on ancillary 
covenants not to compete, United States v. Addyston Pipe &- Steel 
Co.,27 stated that the basic treatment of those covenants under the 
federal antitrust statutes would be the same as under the common 
law. The court's statement that the Sherman Act was intended to 
codify the common law has subsequently been supported by the 
United States Supreme Court.28 The federal courts have considered 
it a settled principle, hardly worthy of discussion, that a reasonable 
covenant not to compete, made incident to the sale of a business 
and good will, is valid as long as it is not a device to control com-
merce, although such an agreement clearly does :restrain trade to 
some extent.29 Typical is an early decision upholding a five-year , 
covenant ancillary to the sale of a river steamer.30 But it would 
appear that a non-ancillary agreement would, under Judge Taft's 
dictum in Addyston,31 be held to violate the Sherman Act. Such an 
25. In Schnitzer v. Southwest Shoe Corp., 364 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. 1963), the lessor 
and a third party, who also owned property in the center, had given the lessee an 
exclusive right to sell shoes in the center. In holding the covenant invalid, the court 
suggested that a different result would have been reached had the covenant been 
made only by the lessor. In Kroger Co. v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 380 S.W.2d 145 (Tex, 
Civ, App. 1964), an agreement by the lessor and a third party not to permit their 
property within two miles of the shopping center to be used in competition with the 
lessee was held to violate the same statute. 
26. TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. art. 7426 (1948). 
27. 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), afj'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). See also Bork, supra note 
2, at 211. 
28. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911). 
29. Darius Cole Transp. co: v. White Star Line, 186 Fed. 63 (6th Cir. 1911), 
cert. denied, 225 U.S. 704 (1912); United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 
(1898) (dictum); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897) 
(dictum). 
30. Cincinnati, P., B.S. &: P. Packet Co. v. Bay, 200 U.S. 179 (1906); accord, Thomas 
v. Sutherland, 52 F.2d 592 (3d Cir. 1931) (allowing a restraint running for one hundred 
years because it was ancillary to the sale of a business). 
31. 85 Fed. 271, 282 (6th Cir. 1898). 
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agreement would amount merely to market division among competi-
tors, a type of restraint which has long been viewed as illegal per se.82 
The greatest difficulty in determining the status under federal 
antitrust law of ancillary covenants not to compete is that in all 
cases to date the ancillary covenants have been only one of a 
number of practices that together have been found to violate sections 
• 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act or section 7 of the Clayton Act. The 
Supreme Court has intimated in a number of. decisions that the 
covenants themselves would not have been illegal had they not 
been a part of a general conspiracy to restrain competition or 
create a monopoly. In one instance, a covenant ancillary to the 
sale of a dairy was held illegal, but in that case the acquisition 
itself violated the Clayton Act.83 In an earlier decision, the Court 
held that long-term covenants not to compete exacted from former 
competitors whose motion picture theaters had been acquired, al-
though not necessarily illegal in themselves, were illegal as part of 
a general scheme to monopolize.84 Most frequently, successful federal 
antitrust attacks upori covenants not to compete have been based 
on the contention that the primary purpose of the transaction was 
to restrain competition or create a monopoly.85 Although it has been 
suggested that it is often difficult to determine primary intent,36 the 
courts have been willing to infer the requisite illegal purpose from 
the existence of a restraint greater than that necessary for the pro-
tection of the covenantee,87 or from the already dominant market 
position of one of the parties.38 The inference of an illegal purpose 
from such factors may be merely a more convenient and traditional 
way for some courts to express a feeling that a particular restraint 
is unreasonable. 
32. E.g., Timken Roller :Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United 
States v. General Dyestuff Corp., 57 F. Supp. 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1944); An'Y GEN. NAT'L 
COMM. ANTITRusr REP. 26 (1955). 
33. Maryland &: Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458 (1960). 
34. Schine Chain Theaters v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948); accord, United 
States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173 (1944). See also United States v. 
American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); United States v. General Dyestuff Corp., 
57 F. Supp. 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1944). 
35. Such a purpose serves to remove the protection ordinarily afforded ancillary 
covenants under the antitrust statutes. Shawnee Compress Co. v. Anderson, 209 U.S. 
423 (1908); Darius Cole Transp. Co. v. White Star Line, 186 Fed. 63 (6th Cir. 1911), 
cert. denied, 225 U.S. 704 (1912); :Bork, supra note 2, at 211. 
36. Carpenter, Validity of Covenants Not To Compete, 76 U. PA. L. REv. 244, 
261-62 (1928). . 
37. Shawnee Compress Co. v. Anderson, 209 U.S. 423 (1908); United States v. Great 
Lakes Towing Co., 208 Fed. 733 (N.D. Ohio 1913). 
38. Maryland &: Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458 (1960). 
See also United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 226 Fed. 62 (W.D.N.Y. 1915), in which 
a company controlling 75-80% of the trade received covenants not to compete for 
five to twenty years from officers of purchased competitors. 
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The most important unresolved issue in this area of federal 
antitrust law concerns the standard of reasonableness to be applied 
to ancillary covenants. Since most attacks on ancillary covenants 
ultimately raise the question of reasonableness, the standard applied 
will largely determine the extent to which these covenants will be 
legal. A recent decision by the Seventh Circuit39 suggests that there 
are two relevant issues of reasonableness: whether the covenant is 
reasonably necessary to protect the main transaction, and whether 
the covenant unreasonably restrains competition. The court held 
that a covenant by a dealer not to compete after the termination 
of his dealership was unreasonable as to geographic scope, and hence 
unnecessary to protect the main transaction; however, the court 
held that, absent proof of a substantial restraint of trade, it did not 
violate the antitrust laws.40 The opposite result would appear pref-
erable. A covenant not to compete is basically a horizontal market 
division removed from its illegal-per-se category41 only because it 
is reasonably necessary to protect a valid principal transaction. When 
the covenant exceeds the limits justified by that transaction, it ought 
to fall within the prohibition of the antitrust statutes. Thus, the 
sole standard under federal law should be whether the restraint is 
reasonably necessary to protect the main transaction.42 Such a stand-
ard requires a close scrutiny, involving considerations similar to 
those relevant under state law, 43 to determine whether the restraint 
is warranted in view of the particular interests to be protected by 
the covenant. _ 
A second unresolved issue in federal law is the relationship be-
nveen the anti-merger provisions of section 7 of the Clayton Act44 
and a covenant by the seller of a business not to compete. Although 
the covenant itself, not being an acquisition, could not violate section 
7, it is arguable that the validity of the covenant under sections 1 
and 2 of- the Sherman Act should be determined by the standards 
of section 7 of the Clayton Act. If the principal transaction were 
to violate section 7, the ancillary covenant would also be illegal, 
both as a covenant not ancillary to a valid transaction45 and as a 
39. Snap-On Tools Corp. v. FTC, 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963). 
40. Id. at 837. 
41. See authorities cited supra note 32. 
42. The following cases appear to support the proposition that the general standard 
is whether the restraint is necessary to protect the main transaction: Tri-Continental 
Financial Corp. v. Tropical Marine Enterprises, Inc., 265 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1959); 
Hall Mfg. Co. v. Western Steel & Iron Works, 227 Fed. 588 (7th Cir. 1915); United 
States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 45 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), aff'd as modified, 
321 U.S. 707 (1944): United States v. Great Lakes Towing Co., 208 Fed. 733 (N.D. 
Ohio 1913). 
43. See notes 51-57 infra and accompanying text. 
44. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964). 
45. See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951). 
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means to an illegal end.46 It has been suggested that if the acquisition 
were legal, a covenant reasonably designed to protect the acquisition 
should also be legal.47 This position, unfortunately, places the em-
phasis upon a separate examination of the two factors-the acquisi-
tion and the covenant. A more careful examination of the entire 
transaction, viewed as a whole, would be preferable. It is conceiv-
able, for example, that a covenant not to compete exacted from key 
personnel of a purchased competitor could be a major factor in the 
determination of whether the effect of the acquisition is substantially 
to lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly in any line 
of commerce.48 Finally, in the situation where the acguisition is legal 
but the covenant unreasonable, the covenant clearly ought to be 
held a violation of the antitrust laws.49 
Because the ordinary covenant not to compete, in itself, only 
forecloses one compe_titor from the market and thus is unlikely to 
have a very significant effect upon competition, federal concern with 
these covenants will probably continue to be restricted to a few 
specific situations. One of these arises when one of the parties has 
sufficient market power, especially in a relatively small market,50 
that the covenant may be seen as part of an overall scheme to re-
strain competition. Another situation arises when the· covenant is 
used to reinforce an acquisition that violates the anti-merger pro-
visions of the Clayton Act. Otherwise, the primary task of policing 
covenants not to compete will continue to fall upon the states, 
either under their general antitrust statutes or under specific statutes 
relating to restrictions upon the exercise of a business. While it 
would be impractical for state attorneys general, even where autho-
rized, to search out and challenge all illegal covenants, state officials 
could take a more active role in policing, at least to the extent of 
establishing guidelines for "reasonable" covenants. 
In policing these covenants, and especially in judging their rea-
sonableness, the courts, both state and federal, must not blindly 
and uncritically apply prior authprity, some of which permitted un-
limited ancillary covenants. The favored position under our anti-
46. See cases cited notes 33-34 supra. 
47. See Bork, supra note 2, at 220. 
48. This reinforcing effect of the covenant may have been important in a recent 
suit filed by the Justice Department challenging, under section· 7, the acquisition by 
the Lima News of its only competitor, the Lima Citizen, and the securing of five-year 
covenants not to compete from nine of the Citizen's employees. United States v. Lima 
News, Civil No. 64-178, N.D. Ohio, Nov: 19, 1964; 5 TRADE REG. REP. 1f 45064. This 
reinforcing effect would be particularly evident if the employees possessed special 
skills or knowledge relatively scarce in the area affected. 
49. See notes 39-43 supra and accompanying text. 
50. This raises the often complicated and obscure question of relevant market 
determination. See generally MASSEL, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY 236-78 (1962); Bock, 
The Relativity of Economic Evidence in Merger Cases, 63 MICH. L. REv. 1355 (1965); 
Stekler, Market Definitions and the Antitrust Laws, 9 A~TITRUST BULL. 741 (1964). 
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trust laws occupied by covenants not to compete is justified only 
because such covenants, like mergers, often serve useful economic 
and social functions.51 The reasonableness of the restraint, then, 
must be determined by the necessity of the restraint in achieving 
the legitimate purposes of the covenant.52 A restraint intended to 
protect the good will of a business, for example, would be reasonable 
only for the period during which the seller's re-entry is likely to 
draw customers away because of his prior dealings with them.53 
While this would normally justify only a short temporal restriction, 
longer restrictions may be warranted in covenants ancillary to shop-
ping center lea\fS.54 Conversely, while a shopping center lease would 
not support a broad geographic restraint, which normally would 
be unnecessary to protect the lessee's investment, the permissible 
geographical restraint ancillary to the sale of a business might be 
much broader.55 Still other considerations, leading possibly to dif-
ferent conclusions as to the reasonableness of a particular restraint, 
are relevant to covenants ancillary to an employment contract50 and 
to the licensing of know-how or trade secrets.57 
51. In the sale of a business, for example, a covenant not to compete given by 
the seller tends to make transferable an asset, good will, that otherwise might not 
be transferable. 6A CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1385 (1962). 
52. Thomas v. Costa! Industrial Services, Inc., 214 Ga. 832, 108 S.E.2d 328 (1959); 
Paramount Pad Co. v. Baumrind, 4 N.Y.2d 393, 175 N.Y.S.2d 809, 151 N.E.2d 609 
(1958). 
53. This and other limits are suggested in Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 77, 99-102, 153 
(1956). These limits were expressly rejected in Rinker Materials Corp. v. Holloway 
Materials Corp., 167 So. 2d 875 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964), where the court, having 
found that competition had not been restricted, upheld a ten-year restriction. 
54. The success of a center depends largely on attracting diverse shops, and this 
may often best be accomplished by granting some kind of exclusive occupancy. Fur-
thermore, the effect of the restraint is lessened because it only restricts the use of 
specific property. See Savon Gas Stations Number Six, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 309 F.2d 
306 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 911 (1962). 
55. At most, however, the covenant should be limited to the area in which the 
business had operated. In Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d 119, 253 (1956), it is suggested that a 
restraint covering a reasonable expectation of future expansion may be valid. If the 
purpose of the covenant is to protect already existing good will, such a restraint is 
greater than necessary. 
56. See generally Blake, Employee Agreements Not To Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 
625 (1960), in which limits of six months to one year, and the area in which the 
employee was employed, are suggested. 
57. See generally Macdonald, Know-How Licensing and the Antitrust Laws, 62 
MICH. L. REv. 351 (1964), where the author argues that restraints need be limited 
only by the "life" of the know-how and to products made by use of the know-how. 
